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Abstract 
It is often assumed that the airlines’ fares increase monotonically over time, peaking a 
few days before the departure. Using fares for about 650 thousand flights operated by both 
Low-Cost and Full Service Carriers, we show several instances in which the monotonic 
property does not hold. We also show that the volatility of fares increase in the last four weeks 
before departure, which is the period when the airlines can formulate a better prediction for a 
flight’s load factor. Finally, especially within the last two weeks, Full Service Carriers may 
offer lower fares than those posted by Low Cost Carriers.  
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1. Introduction  
The conventional wisdom on the temporal profile of airlines’ prices holds that carriers 
facing uncertain demand can enhance their profits by assigning a monotonically increasing price 
to different batches of seats (Dana, 2001). Such a recommendation arises from the fact that 
airlines have to set their price before demand is known, and that the transaction costs of 
adjusting prices in response to current information about demand are high. It is thus important 
to verify if the monotonic property is observed in situations where transaction costs are less 
relevant, i.e., for fares offered on the Internet. 
In this article we use price information for about 650 thousands flights, collected from 
both some European Low-Cost Carriers’ web sites and an online travel agent. The latter was 
used to retrieve prices for flights operated by traditional carriers. An important characteristic of 
our dataset is that for each flight operated by a Low-Cost Carrier (hereafter, LCC) we have up to 
13 fares collected at regular intervals before departure, while for Full Service Carriers (FSCs) 
we could collect up to 9 fares posted before the flight’s departure. Although other studies have 
used fares posted a number of days prior to departure (see, for instance, Pels and Rietfeld, 2004; 
Pitfield, 2005), these were usually for a very limited number of routes. A distinguishing feature 
of our approach is that we retrieved data for a large proportion of routes operated by the main 
LCCs, where they either are monopolists or face competition by other LCCs or FSCs. Therefore 
our analysis, by focussing on the features which are common across routes, enables us to draw 
general conclusions on the different online pricing schemes adopted by the airlines in our 
sample. 
To this purpose, we present evidence that we directly relate to some recent contributions 
on pricing in electronic markets. More precisely, we try to address the following issues: 
• Do fares increase monotonically as the date of departure approaches (Klein and 
Loebbecke, 2003)? 
• Do fares change frequently, i.e., are there menu costs on-line (Brynjolfsson and 
Smith, 2000; Smith et al., 1999)?  
• Is it true that LCCs always offer the cheapest fares, or, consistent with a hit-and-run 
strategy, there is significant variation in the identity of the low-price firm in a 
competitive route (Baye et al, 2004b)? 
While we observe consistent hikes for fares posted less than a week prior to departure, 
we also find that for some airlines the early booking fares may be higher than those available 
from four to two weeks prior to departure. It would therefore seem that the monotonic property 
does not adequately and fully describe the time profile of many LCCs’ pricing schemes. This is 
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probably related to the easiness with which fares can be changed online, due to low menu costs 
(Smith et al., 1999). Interestingly, prices tend to remain more stable when departure is further 
away in the future, while volatility increases as the date of departure approaches. Unexpectedly, 
FSCs tend to change their fares more frequently than LCCs. 
As far as the identity of the low-price firm is concerned, the evidence confirms the 
notion that a LCC offers the lowest price in a competitive route. However, considerable 
differences are observed across LCCs, especially in conjunction to the distinction between early 
and late booking fares. Indeed, the same airline may offer the cheapest early booking fares but 
the dearest late booking fares. Furthermore, we show that a few days before departure it is not 
unlikely that a FSC may offer the cheapest fare.  
The strategy used to collect the data has exploited some of the innovative features of the 
pricing schemes followed by LCCs (Pender and Baum, 2000; Piga and Filippi, 2002; Shon et al. 
2003). For instance, consider some of the forms of price discrimination that have dominated the 
industry and that are highly documented in the literature: the Saturday night stay-over 
requirement, the surcharge for one-way tickets and the advance-purchase discounts (Stavins, 
2001; Giaume and Guillou, 2004). The European LCCs have eliminated completely the first two 
forms: e.g., departing on a Monday and returning on a Thursday is likely to cost less than 
returning on a Sunday. In any case, each leg is priced independently and the same price would 
be shown on-line for the Monday flight if one tried to book a one-way ticket. An important 
implication of pricing each leg independently without any penalization for one-way tickets is to 
have severed the links between airport dominance and market power (Borenstein, 1989 and 
1991). Indeed, the above-mentioned invariance of fares when booking a round-trip or two one-
way tickets implicitly impedes the possibility to take advantage of airport dominance.1 
Furthermore, the European LCCs in our sample do not practice any of the marketing strategies 
indicated as the source of airport dominance (i.e., Frequent Flyer Programme, Travel Agents’ 
Commissions Override programme etc).  
As far as the advance-purchase discount tactic is concerned, it arises from the airlines’ 
need to derive schemes in situations where demands or travellers’ preferences are uncertain 
(Dana, 2001; Gale and Holmes, 1993). A central contribution of this paper is to show that the 
LCCs follow it in a rather flexible manner.  
                                                     
1 Assume that airline 1 dominates airport A, and airline 2 airport B. Both airlines operate a 
service on the route. In the traditional case where airlines impose a penalty for one-way tickets, airline 1 
could charge more for round-trip tickets originating in A, and airline 2 would do the same for round-trips 
originating in B. Absent the penalty and all else equal, arbitrage would significantly erode the airlines’ 
market power.  
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It is also widely known that all LCCs offer “no-frills” flights with no class distinction 
for seats, thus excluding any form of discrimination based on quality (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). 
Finally, price variations due to the inclusion of connecting flights are ruled out by the fact that 
LCCs issue only “point to point” tickets (Clemons et al., 2002).  
In the next section we illustrate the data collection strategy. This is followed by three 
sections where we address the questions listed above and present some supporting evidence. 
Some business strategy implications are discussed in the concluding section.  
2. Data Collection 
Most of the empirical contributions on pricing behaviour in the Civil Aviation industry 
have focused, so far, mainly on the U.S. market. Such studies have been mostly conducted 
relying on different cohorts of the same dataset, namely the Databank of the U.S.A. Department 
of Transportation’s Origin and Destination Survey, which is a 10 percent yearly random sample 
of all tickets that originate in the United States on U.S. carriers (Borenstein, 1989 and 1991; 
Evans and Kessides, 1993; Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Hayes and Ross, 1998; Stavins, 2001). 
In these studies prices are measured as one-way fares and are computed as one-half of the 
reported fare round-trip tickets. All tickets other than one-way and round trips are excluded.  
In contrast, our analysis is based on primary data on fares and secondary data on routes 
traffic. Since the start of this research project in May 2002, fares were collected using an “ 
electronic spider”, which connected directly to the websites of only the main LCC (i.e., Ryanair, 
Buzz, Easyjet, GoFly) operating in Great Britain at the time. Collection of fares for flights 
operated by Full Service Carriers (i.e., British Airways, Air Lingus, Air France, Lufthansa, 
KLM, Alitalia, Iberia, SAS, Tap Portugal, Air Europa and Maersk) started in March 2003: in 
this case, fares were collected only for flights that Full Service Carriers (FSC) operated on 
routes similar or identical to those where a LCC also flew.2 This decision was necessary to 
reduce the number of routes under study, where each route is identified in this study as an 
airport pair combination.  
The dataset includes daily flights information from June 2002 up to, and including, June 
2004, for a total of 25 months. Over such a period, a number of important events took place, 
which are reflected in the dataset. First, a series of takeovers occurred: Easyjet acquired GoFly 
(December 2002) and Ryan Air took over Buzz (March 2003). Second, new LCC began their 
                                                     
2 The airfares of the traditional companies were collected from the website www.opodo.co.uk, 
which is owned and managed by British Airways, Air France, Alitalia, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, Aer 
Lingus, Austrian Airlines, Finnair and the global distribution system Amadeus. Thus, fares listed on 
Opodo are the official prices of each airline, although Opodo may not report promotional offers that each 
airline may offer on their web sites. 
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operations: the “spider” was upgraded to retrieve fares from the Bmibaby and MyTravelLite 
sites. However, due to technical difficulties, fares from Flybe, which was already an established 
LCC, and Thomson Fly, a new entrant could not be obtained.  
Over the 25 months period, fares from UK for flights to and from the following Euro-
adopting countries were obtained: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. A term of comparison is provided by fares for flights to the 
following countries outside the Euro area: Czech Republic, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland as 
well as UK, whose domestic routes were also considered. 
In order to account for the variety of fares offered by airlines at different times prior to 
departure, every day we instructed the spider to collect the fares for departures due, 
respectively, 1, 4, 7, 10, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49, 56, 63 and 70 days from the date of the query. 
Henceforth, these will be referred to as “booking days”. So, for instance, if we consider London 
Stansted-Rome Ciampino as the route of interest, and assume the query for the flights operated 
by a given airline was carried out on March 1st 2004, the spider would retrieve the prices for 
both the London Stansted-Rome Ciampino and the Rome Ciampino-London Stansted routes for 
departures on 2/3/04, 5/3/04, 8/3/04, 11/3/04 and so on. The return flight for both types of 
directional journey was scheduled one week after the departure. For those routes where an 
airline operates more than one flight per day, all fares for every flight were collected. Thus, for 
every daily flight we managed to obtain up to 13 prices that differ by the time interval from the 
day of departure. The main reason to do so was to satisfy the need to identify the evolution of 
fares - from more than two months prior to departure to the day before departure – which has 
been noted to be very variable for the case of LCC (Pels and Rietveld, 2004; Giaume and 
Guillou, 2004). While the spider could have retrieved any number of prices, in practice the need 
to reduce both the number of queries made to an airline server and the time of programme 
execution to a manageable level, led to the design above. Furthermore, given the site 
characteristics of Opodo, it was impossible to collect Full Service Carriers’ fares 1 and 4 days 
prior to departure: it was also decided to omit collecting fares from these companies for flights 
due to depart more than 49 days after the query. Thus, for FSCs, up to 8 fares per daily flight are 
available.  
The collection of the airfares has been carried out everyday at the same time: in addition 
to airfares we collected the name of the company, the time and date of the query, the departure 
date, the scheduled departure and arrival time, the origin and destination airports and the flight 
identification code. Fares were collected before tax and handling fees. Furthermore, fares for 
LCC were one-way, while those for FSC were for a round trip and were therefore halved.  
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To complement the price data with market structure characteristics, secondary data on 
the traffic for all the routes and all the airlines flying to the countries indicated above was 
obtained from the UK Civil Aviation Authority (henceforth, CAA).3 For each combination of 
company, route and departure period (i.e., month/year), the CAA provided the number of 
monthly seats, the number of monthly passengers and the monthly load factors. These were 
broken down at the flight identification code level, that is, for each flight each airline operated 
in a given month on a route. However, in order to create a more balanced panel, fares and traffic 
statistics were aggregated at the route level for each airline. 
Table 1 illustrates how the data retrieved from the Internet represent an accurate sample 
of the activity of each of the LCCs in the markets we consider. It compares the number of routes 
for which we have price data with the actual total number of routes by each airline. The latter 
figure is taken from the CAA dataset, which also provides the number of routes where our 
LCCs face competition by either a major FSC or another LCC. To test the spider’s functionality, 
initially we limited the number of surveyed routes. Indeed, in August 2002 the percentage of 
routes with prices was 63% (37 over 59) of the total number operated by Ryan Air, 50% for 
Easyjet, 64% for Buzz and 46% for GoFly. However, thanks to the speed of the programme, 
within a few months such percentages could be increased significantly for all the airlines, to 
cover 80% or more of the total routes they operated. Considering that the spider took all the 
prices for all the daily flights, the price dataset provides an exhaustive illustration of the on-line 
pricing activity of each airline.  
Table 1 also shows that the airlines differ in the amount of competition they face. For 
instance, in about 25% of EasyJet’s routes at least another competitor (FSC or LCC) is also 
present. At the other extreme, Ryan Air (and Buzz to a lesser extent) faced competition in a very 
limited subset of routes. The other airlines lie somewhere in between, with competitive routes 
accounting for about 33% of the total. Such differences may be driven by the choice of the 
arrival destinations. Ryan Air and Buzz chose almost exclusively secondary airports that may be 
many miles away from the city of arrival, while the other airlines also fly to major airports 
where FSC also land. 
3. The temporal profile of fares 
Existing theoretical literature like Gale and Holmes (1992,1993) and Dana (1998, 2001) 
state various reasons for the airlines to offer lower-priced seats to earlier purchasers. Gale and 
Holmes (1993) use a mechanism design approach to explain the adoption of Advance-Purchase 
                                                     
3 See www.caa.co.uk 
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Discounts (APD) in a monopoly model with capacity constraints and perfectly predictable 
demand. They show that firms using APD practice a form of second-degree price discrimination 
where travellers self-select according to their preference for a peak or an off-peak flight. The 
advice they offer is to set a low fare for the off-peak flight at an early stage. Such a result hinges 
around the assumption of certain demand, implying that the airlines can tell an off-peak flight 
from a peak one. Moreover, its practical implications are that we should expect a flatter 
temporal profile of fares for the peak flights, and a monotonically increasing profile for the off-
peak flights. With demand uncertainty, Gale and Holmes (1992) show that APD can promote 
efficiency by spreading consumers evenly across flights before timing of the peak period is 
known. The implication is that ex-post, both types of flight will exhibit a monotonically 
increasing time profile. For competitive markets where firms set prices before demand in 
known, Dana (1998) shows that firms may offer APD because travellers with more certain 
demand and weaker departure time preferences are better off buying in advance due to the 
presence of other consumers with higher valuations and more uncertain aggregate demand. To 
drive this result is the assumption that the airlines commit to a rationing rule that limits the 
number of cheaper seats and thus reduces the incentive of consumers with more certain demand 
to postpone purchase.  
From an empirical viewpoint, price dispersion may be due to such forms of inter-
temporal price discrimination as the APD, as well as to systematic and stochastic peak-load 
pricing (Borenstein and Rose, 1994). Using an original dataset with information on seats 
availability at each advertised fare, Escobari (2006) finds that the difference in prices paid 
between earlier purchasers and later purchasers is mostly explained by flights’ capacity 
constraints, i.e., peak-load pricing seems to be a highly relevant factor in the determination of 
the shape of the temporal profile of airlines’ fares.  
In the present setting, lack of data on a flight’s load factor at the time the fares were 
retrieved makes it impossible to distinguish the factors behind the temporal price dispersion. 
The size of our dataset however enables us to address the commonly held belief that fares 
increase as the date of departure approaches. Recall how for each flight we obtained up to 13 
fares, collected at regular intervals from 70 days up to the day prior to departure. Table 2 shows 
the mean fares across all routes by booking day and airlines. Even when using such a highly 
aggregate measure, some interesting features arise. For Bmibaby, the mean price offered 42 
days before departure is lower than that posted in the three preceding weeks. Subsequently, 
BMIbaby’s fares increase monotonically, but in a rather flat manner. One could still argue that 
discounts offered 42 days before departure may still be considered within the advance-purchase 
category, but in any case we find the first violation of the monotonic property. Furthermore, 
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considering that mean fares increase only by 5.4 British Sterling between 35 and 10 days prior 
to departure, it is also possible that for a number of flights within this period the monotonic 
property did not hold. As far as Ryan Air’s mean fares are concerned, similarly to BMIbaby we 
observe marginally lower fares 35 days prior to departure, relative to those posted a week 
earlier. However, Ryan Air presents a steeper time profile in the week preceding departure, 
where the fare available four days before departure is more than twice as high as that available 
two months before the flight departs. Such a finding is both consistent with an explanation 
based on the fact that Ryan Air realizes higher load factors (hence, the higher fares are due to 
peak-load pricing) or simply due to its willingness to implement a second-degree form of price 
discrimination as suggested in the previous discussion.  
The mean fares shown in Table 2 for Easyjet provide compelling evidence that the 
monotonic property does not always constitute a precise way to describe the evolution of fares. 
Indeed, those posted 21 and 10 days are lower than those available in the preceding booking 
day. Interestingly, this is consistent with similar evidence for the same airline shown in Pitfield 
(2005) and Pels and Rietveld (2004). The combination of our evidence, which includes a high 
number of routes, with that collected on specific routes seems to suggest the existence of a 
company fixed effect playing a crucial role in the shaping of the temporal price profile in a 
route.  
GoFly is another airlines whose fares’ time profile violates the monotonic property in 
various instances. Indeed, fares available 42, 14 and 7 days before departure are lower than 
those in the preceding periods. The column for MyTravelLite (MTL) exhibits another type of 
pricing behaviour, one that tends to be U-shaped. For this airline we record fares that decline 
every week from 70 up to 35 days before departure, and then rise at first rather smoothly but 
then quite sharply in the last four days. Finally, Buzz seems to be the only LCC in our sample 
whose aggregate fares follow a monotonically increasing, although at a relatively small 
gradient, path.  
Figures 1 and 2 show clearly how the conclusions from Table 1 continue to hold when 
we consider specific routes. Each box in these figures provides a graphical summary of the 
distribution of the fares for each booking day. We focus the attention on the line inside each 
box, which represents the median of the distribution (the lower hinge in the box represent the 
25th percentile, the top hinge the 75th percentile). It is evident how the monotonic property is 
often violated. For instance, in Figure 1 the median price for 21 and 14 days is below that of 28 
days; the 10 days fare is also below the immediately preceding ones. Interestingly, the 10 days 
fare is at the level of the 49 days median price. In Figure 2 the median prices offered 4 and 63 
days before departure are of equal magnitude: within this time interval, fares fluctuate widely.  
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The evidence presented so far suggests that for the LCCs in our sample the commonly 
held belief of airlines’ fares increasing over time misrepresents the actual temporal profile of 
fares. Although the lack of sales data at each point in time does not allow us to identify the 
reasons behind price dispersion, our findings suggest a rather complex relationship between 
fares and load factors. Indeed, exceptions to the monotonic rules often occur between two and 
one month before departure: these may be considered advance-purchase discounts. However, 
they are also observed only a few days before departure, something that is hard to reconcile with 
the recommendations of theoretical models. In the next section we will further investigate the 
extent to which fares change over the booking period.   
Quite interestingly, there seems to be a mismatch between what the airlines preach and 
what they practice. Consider for instance this quote, taken from 
http://www.easyjet.com/EN/Book/aboutourfares.html: “In general, our fares increase as the 
departure date gets nearer, so to get the best deals make sure you book as early as possible”. 
Ryan Air allows itself more leeway when it states: “Our lowest fares generally require an 
advance purchase of 14 days; however this can vary up to 28 days”. Both quotes suggest a 
preference for early bookings, possibly because of the associated financial benefits as a ticket 
purchased 60 days before departure is equivalent to an interest-free loan. In the next section we 
show that such a preference for early booking may be one of the possible reasons behind the 
frequency with which fares change from one booking day to another. 
4. Menu Costs on line? 
As discussed in Smith et al (1999), in an electronic market menu costs, i.e., the costs 
incurred by retailers in making price changes, should be lower, since they are comprised 
primarily of the cost of making a single price change in a central database. Evidence supporting 
this hypothesis can be found in Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), where it is shown that 1) on-line 
retailers change prices of books and CDs more frequently than their conventional counterparts, 
and 2) changes are often of negligible size on-line.  
In Table 3 we show the percentage of times in which we observe a fare change from one 
booking day to the next one. That is, we first calculate all the fare changes between two 
consecutive booking days: e.g., between the 70 and 63 days fares For each airline, we then 
identify the total number of possible changes in the entire dataset, and work out the averages in 
Table 3. Among the LCCs, Ryan Air and MyTravelLite are the ones that are more likely to 
revise their posted fares with, respectively, a probability of 0.65 and 0.62 that two consecutive 
fares may not be identical. For such LCCs as Go Fly and Bmibaby, however, fares tend to 
change less frequently. A surprising feature is that most FSCs exhibit a stronger tendency to 
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revise their fares, with probabilities ranging from 77% for British Airways up to 90% for 
Scandinavian. Although a number of factors may be responsible for such observed variability, 
our main aim in this chapter is to present evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis of small 
menu costs. Table 3 clearly provides support to this hypothesis: what it does not reveal is when 
fare changes are more likely to occur, something we now address. In this sense, the following 
analysis is directly related to that presented in the previous section on the temporal profile on 
fares. 
Figures 3 to 7 illustrate the percentage of flights in which fares between two booking 
periods either remained the same or changed by either increasing or decreasing. Flights are for 
the year 2003. Figure 3 considers the case for fares posted by BMIbaby. About 65% of times 
there is no change between 70 and 63 days: the average fare is £.49.16. About 22% and 13% of 
times fares increased or decreased in this time interval, when mean decreases amount to £9.75, 
while increases to £10.38. A characteristic of Bmibaby is that the probability of a price 
reduction remains relatively stable (and not very high) throughout the whole booking period 
while price increases become more likely as the date of departure approaches. However, about 
35% of flights keep their fares stable in the last week. The relative stability of fares for 
BMIbaby seems to suggest little role for peak-load pricing and a pricing scheme that is 
independent of the realisation of current load factors.  
The case for Ryan Air, illustrated in Figure 4, tells a rather different story. The highest 
percentage of stable fares (about 40%) is obtained in the 63-56 days period. In all other cases, 
the proportion of stable fares is lower. Up until 28 days before departure, we observe a similar 
probability for an increase or a decrease, which tend to be of similar magnitude. From 28 days 
onwards, increases become more likely and of larger size than decreases, which however still 
account for about 25% and 20% of flights in the periods 21-14 and 14-7 days, respectively. This 
contradicts Ryan Air’s quote in the previous section that the lowest fares are available before 14 
or 28 days prior to departure. Conspicuous and almost certain price hikes are observed in the 
last week.  
Figure 5 shows that EasyJet kept its fares stable about 55-60% of times up to 28 days 
prior to departure: a huge jump from 20 to 40% in the probability of observing a discount of 
about £14.8 relative to the price in the previous week is found in the 28-21 days period (see also 
the discussion of Table 2 above). In the last three weeks EasyJet fares are frequently increased, 
and they hardly stay stable in the last seven days. Generally, the evidence for the 3 LCCs above 
is indicative of small menu costs. It also suggests that the enhanced volatility observed within 
four weeks from departure may reflect a more intense use of pricing as an yield management 
tool aimed at increasing a flight’s load factor.  
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The intense variability in posted fares is confirmed in Figures 6 and 7, which consider 
the Summer timetable fares of two FSCs: BMI British Midland and British Airways. The 
probability of a fare decrease falls steadily as the date of departure approaches, although, quite 
surprisingly, for quite a large proportion of BMI flights (about 15%) fares declined in the 14-7 
days period. For both FSCs fares tend to remain less stable than those of BMIbaby and Easyjet, 
and generally the magnitude of changes is smaller than that recorded for the LCCs. Recall how 
the fares for the FSCs were taken from an on-line travel agent, which is also owned by 
Amadeus, the computer reservation service. Thus, it is likely that the fares posted on-line are the 
same as the ones available on Amadeus. The small and highly frequent fare changes even from 
an on-line travel agent supports the hypothesis of small menu costs even in cases where the 
airlines are feeding their fares through a computer reservation system.  
The discussion in this and the previous section highlights some important characteristics 
of airlines’ pricing behaviour on-line. The low menu costs facilitate price changes, an important 
factor that enables companies to gauge current demand by trying out different fares. Note 
however, that while fares may vary across booking days, it is not likely that they change 
frequently within each day. As Ellison and Ellison (2005) discuss, inertia in Internet prices is 
often observed, suggesting that companies do not continually monitor the market situation and 
re-optimize.4 Nonetheless, the variability we observe over the booking period is probably one of 
the reasons why the temporal profile of fares hardly replicates a monotonically increasing curve. 
This reflects the airlines’ ability to combine recommendations from on-line pricing with the 
more traditional schemes typically used in the industry. Indeed, sometimes the airlines may 
want to reconsider the planned pricing scheme they are adopting, in order to reflect and better 
adjust to demand conditions. This is highly facilitated by the Internet technology. Although this 
also suggests the airlines’ preference not to commit strictly to a temporal price discrimination 
scheme, traditional pricing schemes still play a central role. Indeed, in line with the 
conventional wisdom fares generally grow over time and last-minute offers are virtually non-
existent. This makes it highly risky for a traveller to choose to postpone purchase hoping for a 
lower fare to become available. Thus, the prospect of future discounts will not deter low-
evaluation, risk-averse consumers with more certain demand from buying at an early date. 
Therefore the traditional second-degree price discrimination schemes still remain a very 
effective managerial tool even when applied on-line. 
                                                     
4 Moreover, we casually noted that after buying tickets on-line from the LCCs in our study, fares 
remained unchanged despite the obvious reduction in the seat availability.   
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5. Which airline is the cheapest, and when? 
The previous sections have revealed a synergetic relationship between the traditional 
pricing schemes in the airlines’ industry and the opportunities presented by the Internet. It is 
thus worth looking at our data from the perspective offered by some recent theoretical and 
empirical contributions on pricing in on-line markets. Baye et al (2004a) present a model where 
firms using a price comparison site (a “clearinghouse”) must try to sell to two types of 
consumers: “Shoppers” (S), who actively engage in searches on the comparison site and buy at 
the lowest possible price, and “Loyals” (L), who do not search and pay up to their reservation 
value for the service offered by their preferred brand. In a clearinghouse model, the Law of One 
Price does not hold and persistent price dispersion will be observed (Baye et al. 2006). More 
relevant for our purposes, the identity of the firm offering the lowest price will vary 
unpredictably over time (Baye et al. 2004b). This is because randomisation arising from a “hit-
and-run” strategy will be used to prevent rivals from being able to systematically undercut a 
fixed high price. Indeed, should all firms set a high price to extract the maximum surplus from 
Shoppers and Loyals, the predictability of such a scheme would give an incentive to each firm 
to reduce its price by an arbitrarily small amount to attract the Shoppers. To prevent systematic 
undercutting by rivals, firms in highly competitive e-retail markets adopt “hit-and-run” sales 
promotions, which in turn leads to the absence of a persistent “low-price” firm in the market.  
The clearinghouse model can be related to our analysis. We can think of Shoppers as 
those travellers who search for the lowest price in many airlines’ web site, even if they offer 
differentiated routes, while Loyals may be those who do not consider alternative airlines maybe 
because of their preference for a route or type of service (e.g., they may prefer FSCs to LCCs). 
It is clear, however, that some aspects of the clearinghouse model do not directly translate into 
the airlines’ setting.5 A comparison site lists all the available prices for exactly the same 
product. In the airlines industry, flights are differentiated along many horizontal dimensions, 
namely, time of departure and endpoints airports, as well as vertical ones (e.g., the FSCs vs. the 
LCCs business concept).6  
We tried to account for such sources of product differentiation in the preparation of 
Tables 4 to 7, where we show the percentage of times an airline offers the cheapest or the most 
expensive fare over different booking days. We assigned flights into 8 time bands groups of 
similar size and within each time band, we compared fares posted by the airlines operating in a 
                                                     
5 Nonetheless, search engines, e.g. www.traveljungle.co.uk or www.skyscanner.net, are present 
in the European Airlines’ market but they do not operate as the comparison site illustrated in Baye et al 
(2004a, 2004b and 2006). 
6 The time of booking is also a source of differentiation, which we account for by using the 
booking days described above. 
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market defined as a city-pair (e.g., London-Rome). While we are aware that to eliminate any 
effect due to geographical differentiation we should have used the flights within a route (i.e., an 
airport pair), we have shown in Table 1 that the number of competitive routes is very limited, 
especially if we intend to analyse competition between FSCs and LCCs. Therefore, in the 
following analysis we assume that a flight, say, from London Stansted to Rome Ciampino at 
9:30 a.m. can be usefully compared with a flight leaving from London Luton for the same 
destination at 10:00 a.m. However, imperfect substitutability across routes is likely to drive 
some of the results we will present. Another limitation of the present analysis is that, although 
we compare fares for the same booking day, the load factors of each flight at each point in time, 
and thus the cost conditions, may differ.  
Tables 4 and 5 show the percentage of times an airline offers the cheapest or the most 
expensive fare over different booking days in markets where LCCs and FSCs are both present. 
A first interesting result is that LCCs do not always post the cheapest price: this is even more 
surprising when we consider that FSCs operate in major airports that are often considered to be 
able to enhance the quality of a journey’s experience. Most likely, such a finding hinges around 
the imperfect substitutability of the routes in a city-pair. Furthermore, the likelihood to observe 
a cheaper fare by a FSC increases as the date of departure approaches. This may be explained by 
the results in the previous section, where we show that FSCs’ fares are more stable than those 
by LCCs and exhibit smaller changes between consecutive booking periods.  
In addition to helping explaining why sometimes FSCs are cheaper than LCCs, product 
differentiation may also be responsible for the fact that such LCCs as Ryan Air, MyTravelLite 
and EasyJet to a lesser extent, very often turn out to be the “lowest-price” companies in the 
markets where they operate, while the other LCCs quite rarely offer the cheapest fare. That is, if 
differentiation did not matter, the identity of the low- and high price firm would be more 
difficult to predict, as easier substitutability across routes would tend to smooth the differences 
across airlines in Tables 4 to 7. 7 On the contrary, within each booking day in these Tables 
important differences across firms are observed, making the above identities easier to forecast. 
That is, in market where either Ryan Air or MyTravelLite operate, it would be a safe bet to 
expect them to be the low-price companies, especially as far as early booking is concerned.  
Across booking days, the same identities may however vary, thereby further suggesting 
that product differentiation may matter less than the airlines’ idiosyncratic on-line pricing 
behaviour. That is, since the same routes are evaluated for the same airlines, the effects of 
product differentiation are fixed: changes across booking days may be ascribed to the airlines’ 
                                                     
7 That is, if an airline operates a route with better attributes and that therefore the travellers 
prefer, then that airline should always be the one with the highest fares across booking days. 
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pricing schemes. Consider the cases of BMIbaby and GoFly. Especially for the latter, early fares 
tend to be among the highest on the market, but the probability to be the “low-price” firm 
increases as the date of departure approaches. This is even more evident in Tables 6 and 7, 
where we consider the market where only LCCs compete. The probability that BMIbaby offers 
the cheapest fare one day before departure is almost 0.62 (the highest across the companies), but 
it falls to less than 30 % about two months before departure. The same probabilities for Go Fly 
are, respectively, about 40% and 7.5%. A reverse example is given by MyTravelLite, whose 
probability to be the cheapest company falls to 8.3% four days before departure, from more than 
83% in one of the previous booking days. Ryan Air behaves similarly to MyTravelLite, 
although with less drastic variations.  
To conclude, our analysis seems to confirm the hypothesis put forward in Baye et al 
2004b) that the identity of the firm offering the lowest price exhibit some degree of 
unpredictability over time. Such results seem to be independent of the fact that we compare 
fares for imperfectly substitutable flights and can be mainly attributed to the way the airlines set 
their fares over time, a topic we have discussed at length in the previous two sections.  
Nonetheless, within each booking day the low- and high-fare firms are easier to predict, partly 
because of the imperfect substitutability of the routes in a city-pair. Overall, the two results 
combined point at the conclusion that the airlines do not seem to adjust their fares to match their 
closer rivals’ offers. If they did, within each booking day identifying the low-price firm would 
be more difficult than it would seem to be. This confirms the importance of product 
differentiation as a strategic weapon to reduce the incentive to engage in tough price 
competition (Tirole, 1988). The enhanced unpredictability across booking days suggests that the 
heterogeneity of the airlines’ idiosyncratic pricing schemes is thus likely to be mostly motivated 
by the aim to maximise a flight’s load factor and not by concerns about the fares offered by the 
immediate rivals. 
6. Conclusions. 
Using evidence from about 650 thousand flights, for which up to 13 fares were 
available, the present article addressed three highly interrelated topics on the behaviour of fares 
over time: 1) whether airlines’ fares grow monotonically, as it is often assumed; 2) how often 
and when fares change; and 3) which companies offer the lowest price, and when. First, we 
show violations to the monotonic property both when we aggregate fares over all the airlines’ 
routes, and when we consider fares in specific routes. Second, we observe higher volatility of 
fares in the four weeks preceding the departure date. Both findings contrast with the statements 
on some LCCs’ web sites declaring that the best deals are available before 28 days before 
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departure. It would seem that these announcements might be aimed at consumers with more 
certain demands to induce them to purchases early. The high variability of fares serves the 
purpose of discouraging such consumers to postpone the ticket purchase, as the probability of 
the availability of a discounted price in the future is often more than offset by the probability of 
ending up paying a higher price. In this respect, the airlines manage to apply the traditional 
schemes based on a second-degree price discrimination strategy where consumers with more 
certain demand buy at an early stage, while later purchasers with uncertain demand pay a 
premium. A contribution of this article is to show that such traditional schemes are adjusted to 
reflect the innovative features offered by the Internet. Thus, the investigation of the first and the 
second issue leads to conclude that a potential area for future research is a deeper evaluation of 
how the airlines’ traditional pricing schemes can be applied to reflect such prevailing conditions 
on the Internet as low search and transaction costs and high price transparency. A first step in 
this direction is offered in Bachis and Piga (2006), which shows evidence of a form of on-line 
price discrimination entailing the airlines charging, at the same time and for the same flight, 
fares expressed in different currencies that violate the law of One Price.  
The third part of this study explicitly relates airline pricing to some recent theoretical 
and empirical contributions on pricing in electronic markets. In line with the predictions in Baye 
et al (2004b), we find that the identity of the airline offering the lowest price in a market 
changes with the booking day, although within each booking day it tends to remain the same 
and is therefore easier to predict. The former result is obviously related to the first two issues 
analysed in the paper, i.e., the fares’ temporal profile and frequency and timing of their change. 
In Baye et al. (2004b) the unpredictability of the low-price firm is a consequence of the intense 
on-line competition. In our case the identity of the low-price airline changes because of the 
different inter-temporal pricing schemes used by the airlines. These different approaches seem 
to be less driven by competitive pressure, given that the airlines are often protected by product 
differentiation, and more by distinctive strategies used by the airlines to maximise a flight’s load 
factor.  
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Figure 1 – The temporal profile of fares offered by Easyjet on a specific route  
 
 
Figure 2 – The temporal profile of fares offered by Go Fly on a specific route. 
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Figure 3. 
Bmi 2003 : Percentage of times in which airfares are changed relative to 
theprevious booking day; average changes in GBP £; average airfare in GBP £. 
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Figure 4 
Ryanair 2003 : Percentage of times in which airfares are changed relative to the previous 
booking day; average changes in GBP £; average airfare in GBP £.
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Figure 5 
Easyjet 2003 : Percentage of times in which airfares are changed relative to the previous 
booking day; average changes in GBP £;  average airfare in GBP £.  
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Figure 6 
BMI summer
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Figure 7 
British Airways summer
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Table 1 – Number of routes by type of sample, airline and period. 
 BMIBABY RYAN AIR EASYJET 
Year_ 
month 
Routes 
Price 
Sample 
Routes 
CAA 
Sample 
Comp. 
Routes 
CAA 
Sample 
Routes 
Price 
Sample
Routes 
CAA 
Sample
Comp. 
Routes 
CAA 
Sample
Routes 
Price 
Sample
Routes 
CAA 
Sample 
Comp. 
Routes 
CAA 
Sample 
02_07    34 59 7 19 38 9 
02_08    37 59 8 19 38 9 
02_09    37 59 7 28 40 9 
02_10    37 59 7 28 41 10 
02_11    37 60 8 29 41 9 
02_12    37 60 8 61 79 20 
03_01 26 35 10 49 61 9 61 80 20 
03_02 26 35 11 50 64 7 63 82 21 
03_03 30 37 12 50 64 7 66 84 22 
03_04 26 37 9 56 65 7 66 88 19 
03_05 31 40 10 69 88 6 67 89 19 
03_06 32 43 10 69 88 6 67 89 20 
03_07 33 45 11 69 88 6 67 89 21 
03_08 34 45 11 83 89 8 88 92 24 
03_09 35 44 11 83 89 6 88 92 23 
03_10 35 48 13 84 92 8 89 96 26 
03_11 37 42 12 87 93 8 88 95 23 
03_12 38 47 15 87 94 8 88 98 25 
04_01 33 49 15 42 98 8 46 98 25 
04_02 36 47 14 84 94 8 88 98 25 
04_03 38 43 13 84 94 8 89 101 25 
04_04 34 48 17 87 99 10 89 107 27 
04_05 34 50 16 81 94 9 89 110 27 
04_06 34 55 18 84 96 9 88 114 29 
 BUZZ GOFLY MYTRAVELLITE 
02_07 21 33 3 17 37 11    
02_08 21 33 5 17 37 11    
02_09 21 33 5 30 35 9    
02_10 21 32 5 30 39 11    
02_11 20 20 0 32 38 11    
02_12 22 22 0 32 38 11    
03_01 22 22 1       
03_02 22 21 0       
03_03 22 26 4       
03_12       13 14 5 
04_01       13 14 5 
04_02       13 13 5 
04_03       13 11 4 
04_04       13 11 4 
04_05       10 9 3 
04_06       9 9 3 
Source: Price sample is retrieved from the airlines’ web sites, Total routes and competitive routes are 
from the Civil Aviation Authority dataset. 
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Table 2 – Mean fares by airline and booking days. Fares in British Sterling 
 BMI 
Baby 
Ryan 
Air 
Easy 
Jet 
Buzz Go 
Fly 
MTL 
 N Fare N Fare N Fare N Fare N Fare N Fare 
1 24659 68.5 233880 99.4 170810 91.0 6617 84.0 11708 88.5 2841 107.1 
4 25073 65.3 245460 79.0 163589 72.9 5889 76.8 10804 71.8 2837 82.6 
7 25919 60.2 245583 63.2 177324 62.9 6842 72.5 15816 62.6 2972 56.1 
10 25802 58.4 240143 58.5 160884 56.7 6012 68.1 11106 67.3 2923 54.0 
14 25725 56.7 238375 51.2 164496 59.3 6647 66.6 15345 58.9 2871 52.7 
21 25292 54.5 225967 45.4 162229 55.7 6441 62.3 11464 64.6 2764 51.6 
28 24729 54.2 226578 42.7 159942 57.5 6262 59.0 11041 62.4 2665 51.2 
35 24171 53.0 227183 41.2 157437 56.2 5983 56.5 10561 59.9 2560 50.6 
42 23498 47.6 210423 42.1 151369 53.1 5840 55.0 10049 57.9 2402 50.8 
49 22852 49.8 210751 38.2 152408 51.0 5642 53.5 6197 70.5 2210 51.3 
56 18742 49.8 200317 37.3 143147 50.3 5381 51.7 5812 69.5 1978 52.4 
63 21563 48.2 197461 37.8 140777 49.6 5155 49.5 8856 52.7 1819 53.6 
70 21299 45.8 197253 35.9 141639 47.7 4874 48.0 8315 50.6 1610 53.9 
 Source: data retrieved from the airlines’ web sites from June 2002 until June 2004. 
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 Table 3. Percentage of times in which each company changes the airfare offered on its website 
(number of changes in prices, flight by flight, divided by total number of potential price 
changes). 
Company Mean S.D. N 
Bmibaby .44 .185 29248
Ryanair .65 .198 268584
Easjet .56 .191 181644
Buzz .50 .233 6987
GoFly .39 .283 12466
MyTravelLite .62 .215 3179
Aer Lingus .57 .278 8046
Air Europa .54 .260 296
Air France .67 .274 8061
Alitalia .81 .139 6448
BMI .78 .268 33068
British Airways .77 .264 35683
Czech Airlines .80 .204 547
Finnair .87 .192 1298
Iberia .72 .302 4896
KLM .90 .199 6624
Lufthansa .76 .241 18597
MaerskAir .79 .224 683
Scandinavian Airlines  .90 .213 12033
Swiss .82 .234 4228
TapPortugal .75 .240 126
Volare .85 .188 270
Total .63 .234 643012
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 Table 4. Percentage of times in which an airline offers the cheapest airfare. 
Days before departure Company 7 10 14 21 28 35 42 49 Mean
Low-cost companies 
Bmibaby 37 28 28 26 30 32 32 32 31 
Ryanair 74 75 77 79 84 86 85 84 80 
Easyjet 57 61 59 59 52 52 53 55 56 
Buzz 20 19 18 16 24 25 22 21 21 
MyTravel 76 75 65 66 68 68 65 66 69 
GoFly 22 18 16 12 14 15 11 9 15 
Traditional Full Service companies 
Aer Lingus 30 25 23 20 19 17 17 17 20 
Air France 16 13 12 15 10 9 10 9 11 
Alitalia 21 15 13 11 9 9 9 9 12 
BMI 17 17 16 16 17 17 18 18 18 
BA 11 12 13 14 15 14 14 14 14 
Finnair 17 13 11 11 9 9 8 7 10 
Iberia 13 12 12 11 12 12 11 10 11 
KLM 15 10 9 8 7 5 6 5 8 
Lufthansa 8 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 6 
Maersk Air 28 28 21 20 20 23 28 27 23 
SAS 31 30 29 26 25 23 23 23 26 
Swiss 32 42 32 29 29 27 25 26 27 
These percentages are drawn from competitive markets in which 2 to 5 different companies, both LCA and traditional 
carriers, operate. Data for the LCC are for the period running from June 2002 to December 2003. Data for FSC are 
from April 2003 to December 2003. 
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 Table 5. Percentage of times in which an airline offers the dearest airfare. 
Booking days before departure Company 7 10 14 21 28 35 42 49 Mean
Low-cost companies 
Bmibaby 60 66 67 69 64 57 58 57 62 
Ryanair 13 11 9 7 5 4 4 3 7 
Easyjet 9 7 8 8 11 12 11 11 10 
Buzz 80 81 82 84 76 75 78 79 79 
MyTravel 22 25 30 19 17 18 21 16 21 
GoFly 70 76 79 83 81 80 85 87 80 
Traditional Full Service companies 
Aer Lingus 18 20 22 25 28 31 33 34 26 
Air France 40 53 56 69 73 73 75 75 64 
Alitalia 20 22 23 14 13 15 13 13 17 
BMI 22 22 21 21 20 15 18 21 20 
BA 47 43 38 40 41 41 42 42 42 
Finnair 35 33 54 59 63 63 64 64 54 
Iberia 41 71 73 72 75 74 77 74 70 
KLM 48 60 69 75 78 80 82 84 72 
Lufthansa 62 64 68 64 61 62 61 62 63 
Maersk Air 53 62 57 65 59 54 53 52 57 
SAS 36 38 39 41 42 44 45 46 41 
Swiss 19 42 45 51 47 59 60 62 48 
 
* These percentages are drawn from those markets in which operate from 2 to 5 different companies, including both 
LCA and traditional carriers.  
** Data for the LCA are for the period running from June 2002 to December 2003. Data for traditional carriers are 
from April 2002 to December 2003. 
***Air Europa, TapPortugal and Volare are not included because of the low number of observations. 
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Table 6. Percentage of times in which an airline offers the cheapest airfare, when competing 
with other low-cost airlines. % 
Booking days before departure Company 1 4 7 10 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 
Mean
Bmibaby 61.73 47.70 25.67 19.46 17.53 14.95 22.39 32.57 31.47 33.05 29.82 29.38 34.62 30.79 
Ryanair 51.54 58.87 65.43 67.54 71.17 74.10 80.18 78.63 77.30 79.76 77.21 75.89 69.54 71.32 
Easyjet 49.44 49.09 51.00 51.84 51.37 48.26 37.82 36.36 40.67 38.02 41.42 42.24 47.33 44.99 
Buzz 35.58 26.88 16.57 14.56 16.48 13.86 24.22 27.04 20.13 16.22 15.65 20.28 18.12 20.43 
GoFly 40.30 34.18 30.22 26.23 18.48 19.22 21.79 19.69 11.97 11.82 9.84 7.51 6.88 19.86 
My Travel  16.67 8.33 73.33 60.00 46.67 80.00 73.33 78.57 70.00 83.33 60.00 - - 50.02 
* These percentages are drawn from markets in which at most 2, and not more than 3, LCA operate. 
** Data for the LCA are for the period running from June 2002 to December 2003. 
 
Table 7. Percentage of times in which an airline offers the dearest airfare, when competing 
with other low-cost airlines. % 
Booking days before departure Company 1 4 7 10 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 
Mean 
Bmibaby 38.27 51.94 74.00 80.20 82.13 84.70 77.24 67.43 68.13 66.95 70.18 70.62 65.38 69.01 
Ryanair 47.82 40.71 34.20 32.06 28.35 25.71 19.62 21.17 22.60 20.24 22.79 24.11 30.46 28.45 
Easyjet 49.85 50.40 48.36 48.16 48.63 51.74 62.18 63.64 59.33 61.98 58.58 57.64 52.31 54.83 
Buzz 64.42 73.13 83.43 85.44 83.52 86.14 75.78 72.96 79.87 83.78 84.35 79.72 81.88 79.57 
GoFly 55.60 61.54 64.49 67.62 75.25 74.02 71.60 72.05 79.91 79.55 82.38 86.71 86.88 73.66 
My Travel  83.33 91.67 26.67 40.00 53.33 20.00 26.67 21.43 30.00 16.67 40.00 - - 34.60 
* These percentages are drawn from markets in which at most 2, and not more than 3, LCA operate. 
** Data for the LCA are for the period running from June 2002 to December 2003. 
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